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In contemporary tort theory, both economists and moralists advance
the view that tort law can be understood as the embodiment of one
fundamental, overarching principle. For economists it is the principle of
efficiency.' For some moralists, like George Fletcher, it is the principle of
reciprocity of risk.2 While for others, like Richard Epstein, it is the principle
of causal responsibility. 3 In contrast, I reject the idea that the practice can
be understood as a unified whole and argue that tort law implements a
variety of different principles and policies.4 Some of these are economic in
nature, others moral. In this Essay, I develop the underlying moral
principle involved in tort law-the principle of corrective justice.5
In a recent essay6 I presented a fully developed account of the
principle of corrective justice as I have understood and defended it. Aspects
of that account have been the target of powerful criticisms advanced by
Stephen Perry. 7 Largely as a consequence of these objections, I have
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5. In what follows, I present a particular conception of corrective justice. Like any
conception, this one will be controversial and contestable. A central question the reader will
want answered is: by what criteria are competing conceptions of corrective justice to be
evaluated? This is an especially important question, since even among tort theorists who
advance the view that to some extent at least tort law is a matter of corrective justice, there is
virtually no agreement about what corrective justice requires. In the argument that follows, I
will defend my version of corrective justice and comment on how various conceptions are to
be evaluated. Ultimately, no defense of a conception of corrective justice is satisfactory in the
absence of a foundation for it. Of course, different views exist about what counts as an
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reconsidered the content of corrective justice as a moral ideal. This Essay
develops a new conception of corrective justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that you are extremely wealthy. Your wealth exceeds that of
the Rockefellers. Assume, moreover, there is no possible principle of
distributive justice with which your current wealth is compatible. In other
words, you have more than that to which you would be entitled under even
the most inegalitarian, but defensible, principle of distributive justice.
Suppose my situation is just the opposite. I am dreadfully poor. I have less
than that to which I would be entitled under even the most inegalitarian,
but defensible, conception of distributive justice. Thus, neither of our
positions can be sustained under any plausible theory of distributive justice.
As luck would have it, one day I ram my car into yours causing you to
endure a significant financial setback. You are now less wealthy than
before, and, a fortiori, closer to the demands of distributive justice. Just to
complete the story, suppose somehow the wealth you lose is transferred to
me. Perhaps an auto accident is an implausible way to transfer wealth. In
that case, simply suppose I defraud you of your money.
The question is whether you have a right to repair or to compensation
against me. After all, you have no right to your wealth under the relevant
principle of distributive justice; and, if you have no right to your wealth,
how can you have a right to have it restored when I reduce it? We can
imagine a range of reasons for compensating you which have nothing to do
with justice or right. For example, the possibility of securing compensation
gives you a reason for suing me. Further, suing me for negligence or
wrongdoing also privately enforces safe driving. Compensating you in-
creases the cost of my negligence and thus provides me with an incentive to
drive safely. Can compensating you be a matter ofjustice as well, and, if so,
under what principle of justice?
It may be good social policy to compensate you and in so doing to
recreate or protect a patently unjust distribution of wealth. This may seem
like a price worth paying to create the right incentives: yours to sue, mine
to drive safely. I suggest, however, that compensating you can also be a
matter of justice. Justice may require your entitlement to repair even if it
reinforces less than wholly just holdings. One consequence of my view is
that justice may sustain an unjust distribution of wealth. I believe one must
be committed to this if your claim to repair against me can be a matter of
justice in those cases in which the underlying entitlement cannot itself be
defended as required by justice.8 If sustaining or protecting a less than fully
8. The view of corrective justice I put forward is partially motivated by two pretheoretical
commitments that I am prepared ultimately to abandon, but which can be abandoned only at
some cost to the plausibility of one's theory. These are: (1) the belief that your claim to
compensation in the case I have constructed can be a matter ofjustice as well as efficiency; and
(2) the New Zealand plan for allocating accident costs may be wrongheaded, unworkable,
maybe even inefficient, but it does not constitute one gigantic affront to the principle of
corrective justice. I will have more to say about the New Zealand plan and similar liability
schemes when we turn our attention to institutional embodiments of the principle of corrective
justice. See Coleman, supra note *. For now, I want to confine the discussion to the principle
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just distribution of wealth or resources sometimes can be a matter ofjustice,
it cannot be a matter of distributive justice. Then what sort of justice is it?
The answer is corrective justice. Before I say anything more about the
demands of corrective justice and the way those demands fit with those of
distributive justice, it is important to distinguish between endorsing injus-
tice and implementing a policy that has the effect of sustaining or
protecting injustice. The difference goes to the point or purpose of an
institution or the intentions of the agents within it. Meeting the demands of
corrective justice may recreate or sustain an unjust distribution of holdings,
but endorsing distributive injustice is not part of the point of corrective
justice. Of course, if meeting the demands of corrective justice entrenches
distributive injustice, that might serve as a reason against devoting substan-
tial resources to meeting the demands of corrective justice.9
II. THE ANNULMENT CONCEPTION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The first conception of corrective justice I want to discuss-the one I
previously have defended in my writings-is the annulment thesis.10
According to the annulment thesis, the goal of corrective justice is to
eliminate, rectify, or annul wrongful (or unjust) losses.' Corrective justice,
of corrective justice itself.
9. For an extensive account of the demands of corrective justice and of the ways in which
corrective and distributive justice connect to one another, see Coleman, supra note *.
10. This is the conception of corrective justice I formerly defended, but no longer do. My
most detailed defense of it appears in Coleman, supra note 6.
11. Three limitations on this principle need to be mentioned. First, not every loss, however
wrongfully created, is the concern of corrective justice. Suppose losses are wrongful if they are
the result of negligent or wrongful interference with a person's legitimate interests. Then
whenever a person has suffered a wrongful loss in this sense that person will have the makings
of a claim in corrective justice to repair. But, there are many losses that an individual suffers
at the hands of others. Although they may fall within the ambit of morality, they are
nevertheless outside the scope ofjustice. So what we will need is a theory about which interests
of the person fall within the scope of corrective justice. That theory will not itself be part of
corrective justice, but will instead set its boundaries. The analogous problem in torts is the
problem of specifying the range of compensable harms or protected interests. Even when we
know what the principles and standards of recovery in torts are, we may still have questions
about the sorts of losses for which victims can seek repair, or the kinds of interests the law seeks
to protect.
Second, corrective justice is concerned fundamentally with the gains and losses one person
causes another. I suppose it is possible to wrong oneself and therefore to impose wrongful
losses upon oneself. Similarly, it may be possible to secure wrongful gains at no one's expense.
These gains and losses are not primarily the concern of corrective justice, though in my view
there may be no reason to exclude them entirely from its ambit.
Finally, the analysis of corrective justice in this Essay focuses primarily on wrongful losses
and the institutions made available for rectifying them. Rectifying wrongful losses is central to
tort law in a way in which rectifying wrongful gains is not. The institution of restitution
concerns itself primarily with wrongful gains. Restitution damages in contracts have a similar
purpose. It is not part of my view that there is anything like a one-to-one mapping of
principles ofjustice to legal institutions: retributive justice to the criminal law, corrective justice
to tort law, distributive justice to contract, and so on. Rather, our institutional practices are
sensitive to a range of social facts that shape them. Wrongful losses can arise for all sorts of
reasons; therefore, nullifying them by tort is a good idea generally. Other kinds of wrongful
losses, however, can arise from breach of promise, and those are best dealt with under some
other area of the law such as contract. To say that tort law embodies an ideal of corrective
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so conceived, specifies grounds of recovery and liability; it does not specify
a particular mode of rectification. It does, however, constrain the set of
possible modes of rectification. Wrongful gains and losses cannot be
annulled to create other wrongful gains or losses. Thus, any mode of
rectification that does not create wrongful gains and losses is compatible
with corrective justice; and any mode of rectification that creates wrongful
losses violates corrective justice.
Only wrongful losses fall within the ambit of corrective justice.
Therefore, any conception of corrective justice requires a substantive
account of wrongfulness. Wrongful losses must be annulled, and the threat
of creating new ones restricts the institutions we might develop for
rectifying existing ones. Indeed, different conceptions of wrongfulness
identify different losses as wrongful and different institutional mechanisms
as permissible modes of rectification. For example, if it is wrongful to
impose a loss upon those who do not agree to have the loss imposed upon
them, then whenever someone injures a person who has not assumed the
risk or otherwise consented to injury, the victim has suffered a wrongful
loss deserving of repair. The victim's loss can be rectified in any way that
does not create a wrongful loss. Imposing the loss upon anyone other than
those who agree to bind themselves would be impermissible. Of course,
injurers or wrongdoers may not agree to bind themselves, and, if they do
not, imposing liability upon them would violate corrective justice. This may
be one reason for rejecting the view that involuntariness of a loss is a
sufficient condition of its being wrongful.
In contrast, if a loss is wrongful only if it results from inefficient
conduct, many victims who have not agreed to accept certain risks or to
have losses imposed upon them may have no claim in corrective justice to
repair. If someone does have a legitimate claim in justice to repair, any
mode of rectifying it would be permissible provided that liability could be
justified on efficiency grounds. Imposing the victims' losses on the
cheapest-cost-avoiders, for example, would be permissible even if cheapest-
cost-avoiders have not agreed to bind themselves, indeed, even if they are
in no other way responsible for the loss in question.
As I have characterized it, the annulment thesis strictly prohibits
institutions from rectifying wrongful gains and losses in ways that create
additional wrongful gains and losses. On its face, this constraint may be too
strong. Suppose a very substantial loss could be rectified by creating a
rather minor one. Can corrective justice really mean to prohibit implement-
ing an arrangement that would reduce the extent of wrongful losses in the
world simply because the arrangement may occasionally require the
imposition of another wrongful loss? Should not corrective justice look at
both sides of the loss equation?
If corrective justice requires rectifying wrongful losses, but prohibits
doing so if it creates other wrongful losses, then corrective justice may
justice is not to say that all and only wrongful gains and losses are rectified within it. Tort law
is, in my view, especially concerned with rectifying wrongful losses. It is a further question, but
not one strictly speaking of moral or legal philosophy, as to why tort law is not a particularly
good institution for rectifying wrongful gains.
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permit considerable wrongful loss. On the other hand, if corrective justice
permits the imposition of wrongful losses in order to eliminate even greater
losses, then at least it minimizes the total amount of corrective injustice in
the world. Which is the proper way of understanding the demands of
corrective justice? 12
One problem with .imposing corrective injustices in order to annul
greater wrongful losses is that it threatens to turn corrective justice into a
form of efficiency. Thus, rather than saying that justice requires eliminat-
ing wrongful gains and losses as such, we are really advocating minimizing
the extent of corrective injustices as a whole. The underlying economic
principle consists of minimizing the sum of "x" and the costs of reducing
"x," where "x" is replaced by "corrective injustice." Thus, one who has
suffered a wrongful loss at the hands of another has no claim in justice to
repair, as such. Instead, like everyone else, that person is entitled to the
least corrective injustice in the world. This means the injured is entitled to
repair in a particular case only if the compensation is "corrective-injustice
minimizing," but not otherwise.
Within the annulment thesis, there is a way of responding to this
problem that both allows us to treat claims in corrective justice adequately
and to impose some corrective injustices in order to eliminate significant
ones. First, it is always wrong to create a corrective injustice in order to
rectify a wrongful loss if it is possible to correct the loss without doing so.
Second, one can reject the claim that corrective injustice ought to be
minimized. Instead, one might hold that it sometimes is permissible to
impose a wrongful loss in order to eliminate another wrongful loss only if
there is a substantial or significant difference between the loss eliminated
and the loss created. Thus, advocates of the annulment thesis can reject the
"optimizing" conception of corrective justice. While they admit that some-
times it is permissible to impose wrongful losses in order to annul other
wrongful losses, they reject the marginalist form of reasoning about when
doing so is permissible.
However plausible or intuitive this solution is, nothing I have said so
far represents a defense of it. Moreover, I have no intention of providing
the needed defense here, other than by analogy. The analogy concerns the
way we normally think about rights and claims based on rights. Claims
based on rights can be defeated by considerations, say, of utility. But part
of what it means to have a right-part of its syntax-is that the claims based
upon rights cannot be defeated by mere marginal increments in utility. The
claim of right establishes a "significance" threshold. The gain in utility must
be substantial before the claims of rights are overcome or defeated.
Thus, one can accommodate claims of rights and utility in a way that
does justice to both. On the other hand, if claims of marginal advantage
could defeat claims based on rights, we could not say that people really had
rights; rather, we would be optimizers or utility maximizers with no real
account of rights. That is one reason, for example, David Lyons has denied
12. See infra, A Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, at Part IV.
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that there can be a utilitarian theory of rights.' 3 Utilitarians are committed
to incrementalist reasoning in a way that is incompatible with the signifi-
cance threshold entailed by rights.
Something similar, I am suggesting, is true of claims to repair in
corrective justice. Corrective justice specifies grounds, not modes, of
rectification. It constrains modes of rectification to the extent that it does
not normally permit the creation of wrongful losses as a way of eliminating
other wrongful losses. On some occasions, however, when no other
alternatives are available and the difference between the loss created and
the loss eliminated is sufficiently great, corrective justice may permit the
creation of what would otherwise be a wrongful or unjust loss.
14
As I have stated it, the principle of corrective justice appears to hold
that justice consists entirely in creating a certain state of the world in which
wrongful gains and losses are annulled. From the point of view of justice,
it seems that each of us has the same responsibility to bring about that state.
In other words, corrective justice so understood, gives no one in particular
any special reason for acting.
Suppose we hold that justice and morality are guides for action. Thus,
principles of justice and morality do not simply provide answers to
metaphysical questions, ' 5 they give agents reasons for acting. Their impor-
tance depends on their role in practical reasoning. One way in which
corrective and distributive justice might differ, then, is with respect to the
ways in which they figure in an individual's practical reasoning. Corrective
and distributive justice are distinct principles of justice. They give individ-
uals different kinds of reasons for acting. This is not how corrective and
distributive justice differ in the annulment view, however. As I character-
ized it, the annulment view appears to hold that justice requires a certain
state of the world be brought about, but no one in particular has a special
reason in justice for bringing it about. This is precisely the way we think
about distributive justice. Therefore, in terms of their reason-giving prop-
erties, corrective justice is indistinguishable from distributive justice.
13. David Lyons, Utility as a Possible Ground of Rights, 14 Nous 17 (1980).
14. A further question asks how we can talk about greater or lesser wrongful losses. You
injure me wrongfully causing $100 in losses. This is the wrongful loss I suffer. Suppose you
are judgment proof, and there is no way of shifting the loss to you. We have to shift it to
someone else. Could it ever be less of a wrongful loss to shift it to someone else? Would not
it always be a $100 wrongful loss? That depends on how we analyze the notion of a wrongful
loss. Some might suggest that if we impose the loss on someone other than the injurer through
the machinery of the state, it is a greater wrongful loss simply because the state is imposing the
cost or because it is being imposed on someone who had nothing to do with the original
interaction. If the cost is imposed on someone unsavory then some might argue that the
injustice is a lesser wrong than imposing it on the innocent victim. Everything hinges on how
we analyze the components or elements of wrongful loss. Another possibility is that the victim
suffers the damage of $100, but receives no offsetting benefit. On the other hand,' imagine
some third party who, as a result of the injury, is benefitted $50. If the victim's loss is shifted
to that party, we might say that the victim would suffer only a $50 wrongful loss instead of
$100. We subtract the third party's benefit-wrongful or not-from the $100 loss we impose
upon the third party.
15. One view of moral principles is that they answer metaphysical questions, not problems
in practical reasoning. In other words, rather than providing us with reasons designed to guide
our actions, they tell us which acts, persons, or social states are good, right, and the like.
[1992]
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At the outset, I suggested one might appeal to corrective justice in
ways that might sustain distributive injustices. That means that corrective
justice must be distinct from distributive justice. We have just suggested,
however, that if corrective justice is understood in terms of the annulment
thesis, it creates reasons for acting in the same way (and of the same type)
that distributive justice does. If the difference between the two is to be
reflected in terms of the reasons for acting each creates, the annulment
view appears unable to distinguish corrective from distributive justice. It
would fail, therefore, as a defensible conception of corrective justice.
An example illustrates the basic problem. If Josephine steals Ronald's
radio, then Josephine has a reason to act under corrective justice that
neither you nor I have. Neither of us has a responsibility to see that
Ronald's radio is returned or, if it is damaged, that he is compensated.
Rather, Josephine has a reason for returning the radio that none of us has.
The same would not be true with respect to our duties to Ronald in
distributive justice. If distributive justice required that certain needs of
Ronald's be met, then each of us would have the same kind of reason under
justice to see to it that those needs were met.
If corrective justice provides individual agent-relative reasons for
acting in this sense, it cannot be a principle that provides only grounds for
claims to recovery and liability. It must be a principle that specifies
individual rights and responsibilities. And if it specifies a system of
correlative rights and responsibilities, it also specifies a particular mode of
rectification. Those who possess the duty in corrective justice to make
repair must be made liable injustice to do so. Any other scheme of liability
offends justice. Josephine's wrong is taking Ronald's radio; corrective
justice imposes the duty upon her to return it or, if she has ruined it, to
replace it. No one else in corrective justice has the same reason for acting
as Josephine does; no one must do what she must do.
The annulment view faces two general, but related problems. First, it
seems unable to account for the distinction between distributive and
corrective justice. Second, it provides only grounds for recovery, whereas a
proper conception of corrective justice will specify a mode of rectification as
well as a reason for doing so. Rectification in corrective justice wil be the
duty of someone in particular. This suggests that the annulment view must
be augmented or abandoned. Before considering an alternative to it, let us
develop these objections to the annulment more fully in the hopes of
establishing their ultimate persuasiveness.
III. THE RELATIONAL CONCEPTION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Until recently, I believed that the annulment thesis provided the only
plausible interpretation of corrective justice. Joseph Raz,16 Ernest
16. Professor Raz has influenced my view largely through conversation. See A Symposium,
The Works of Joseph Raz, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 731 (1989).
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Weinrib, 17 and especially, Stephen Perry' 8 have convinced me that the
annulment thesis is untenable. The annulment thesis does not provide
anyone with any special reason for acting. If someone has suffered a
wrongful loss then that loss should be eliminated. But how and by whom?
The answer implicit in the annulment view appears to be: it depends.
Justice itself does not tell us who should do what to repair the damage.
Instead it warns us against rectifying the loss in any way that creates
additional wrongful loss. This feature of the annulment thesis reduces
corrective justice to a form of distributive justice. This is the line of
argument suggested above. Let us develop it in somewhat greater detail.
In one view of distributive justice, we all have reasons for acting in
certain ways for providing each member of the community with whatever
the principle of distributive justice requires. This responsibility falls on each
of us, but coordination in efficiently discharging this duty is difficult.
Therefore, we create a larger institution, the state, which acts as our agent
and ensures that we discharge our obligations under distributive justice.19
We have other responsibilities to one another that are not matters of
distributive justice; they are owed by us to other persons as a result of
actions we undertake and relationships we form. Some of these duties are
contractual and result from commitments of one sort or another. Others
arise from the advantages we take of one another or the harms we occasion.
So if I take your watch, I alone have a duty to return it. If I somehow
destroy it, then I alone owe you compensation.
Perhaps if I take all your possessions, you will fall below the social
safety net. Everyone has a responsibility to see to it that people are situated
above the safety net. I now have two connected responsibilities: one to
return what I have taken; the other to see to it that you rise above the safety
net. I can discharge both by returning your possessions. If I do not, then
you are below the safety net and the duties of others under distributive
justice apply. Each person has a duty to see to it that you rise above the
safety net, which might entail working to get me to return your possessions,
or failing that, to see to it that you are compensated for your loss. Usually
that duty will be discharged by the state through welfare or other forms of
social insurance. But the state is merely acting as our agent in discharging
our duties under distributive justice.
Notice that the duty each of us has in distributive justice to compensate
you is triggered only when you fall below whatever distributive justice
claims is your entitlement. No one is responsible to make good your loss.
Only the injurer, that is me, is required to return your possessions or make
good your losses independent of considerations of distributivejustice. Only I have
a duty to return or repair in corrective justice. That is the essential point of
17. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 Law & Phil. 37
(1983).
18. Professor Perry has influenced my view in numerous conversations. See Perry, supra
note 7.
19. For similar coordination-related reasons, we may empower this state to do other things
as well, like provide public goods.
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what I call the "relational conception of corrective justice." It is a point
whose difference with the annulment theory is worth emphasizing.
In the annulment thesis, wrongdoing creates no special reason for the
wrongdoer to act. Rather, the focus appears to be entirely on the victim's
loss. That loss should be annulled. In general, we have interests in the
well-being of victims and are sensitive to shifts in their wealth. Should they
suffer a diminution in welfare because of a flood, a hurricane, or some
other misfortune, then we might feel that their loss is undeserved and
should, if possible, be eliminated. The losses they suffer at the hands of
others are also of this sort. They are losses that are undeserved and should,
if possible, be eliminated. In the same way that losses owing to misfortune
create grounds for annulment, so too do losses owing to the wrongful
mischief of another. If the argument for eliminating losses in one case is
beneficence, then so too is the argument for doing so in the other. If it is
our responsibility in distributive justice to eliminate losses owing to natural
disasters or undeserved handicaps, then the argument that brings wrong-
fully inflicted losses to our attention is also one in distributive justice. Losses
owing to wrongdoing are among the set of losses that generally ought to be
eliminated.
The problem for the annulment view is that corrective justice provides
particular persons with reasons for acting, and it is that fact that distin-
guishes corrective from distributive justice. Without the imposition of a
duty or responsibility, corrective justice is reducible, at best, to one or
another form of distributive justice. That seems to be an implication of the
annulment thesis. To wit, wrongfully-imposed losses are among the losses
that should be compensated, but, arguably, so are losses that result from
handicaps, natural disasters, and misfortunes generally.
In the annulment view, the point of corrective justice is to eliminati¢ or
rectify certain gains and losses. It says nothing about who has this duty, if
anyone does, in justice. The alternative conception of corrective justice-
what I call the "relational view"-makes exactly the opposite claim. It denies
that corrective justice has any point or purpose with respect to the category
of gains and losses. The existence of a loss is not necessary to trigger
corrective justice, nor is the point of corrective justice to annul or eliminate
the loss. Rather, it specifies a framework of rights and responsibilities
between individuals. In the relational view, it is the wrong, not the loss that
must be annulled. The relational view claims, in effect, that corrective
justice operates on relationships between persons. If one person has
wronged another, then corrective justice imposes a duty on the wrongdoer
to rectify his wrong. In the annulment thesis, in contrast, the fact that one
person wrongs another creates a state of the world that is the concern of
justice, but perhaps not of anyone in particular, including the wrongdoer.
In the relational view, the fact that one person wrongs another affects the
system of rights and responsibilities between them.
There are two important differences between the annulment and the
relational views. In the annulment view, corrective justice is triggered by
wrongful losses. Its point or purpose is to eliminate or rectify losses (and
gains). In doing so, it does not appear to impose the responsibility to annul
on anyone in particular. In contrast, wrongful losses are of no direct
HeinOnline  -- 77 Iowa L. Rev. 435 1991-1992
77 IOWA LAW REVIEW
consequence in the relational view. Corrective justice has no point or
purpose, let alone the specific purpose of annulling them. Moreover, in the
relational view, correctivejustice establishes a scheme of responsibilities and
rights. Thus, unlike the annulment thesis, the relational view creates
specific, agent-relative reasons for acting.
It is important to distinguish the relational view from other concep-
tions of corrective justice with which it might be confused. Richard Epstein,
for one, appears to hold that justice requires that the individuals causally
responsible for the losses of others be held liable in order to make those
losses good.20 If I understand his position correctly, Epstein shares with the
annulment thesis the view that the point of corrective justice is to eliminate
wrongful losses. His view differs from the annulment thesis in holding that
such losses ought to be eliminated by imposing liability on particular
wrongdoers. The annulment view is agnostic with respect to liability for
loss. It shares with Epstein, however, the view that the normatively
significant aspect of the relationship between persons from the point of
view of corrective justice is the existence of wrongful losses.
Though the relational view appears similar to Epstein's position, in
fact it denies both of Epstein's central tenets. In the relational view,
wrongful losses as such are normatively unimportant. Their existence does
not trigger the application of the principle, nor is it the point of the
principle to eliminate or rectify wrongful losses. Rather, the fact that
someone wrongs another creates the relevant duty in corrective justice.
Losses have nothing to do with it. Moreover, while Epstein believes that
losses should be annulled by imposing liability upon particular
wrongdoers, 21 the relational view does not assert that there is only one
institutional form through which the debts under corrective justice can be
discharged. Thus, while the relational thesis rejects annulment as the point
of corrective justice, it accepts the distinction between the claims of
corrective justice and the institutional forms available for satisfying them.
In this regard, it is similar to the annulment thesis.
Because the relational view is concerned entirely with the ways in
which wrongdoing alters individual rights and responsibilities, it is possible
to confuse it with attempts to embed corrective justice in a particular
account of what it is to have a right, and in doing so to provide a conceptual
foundation for corrective justice. Providing a foundation for the relational
conception of corrective justice is important because it is unclear why
corrective justice has no goal beyond identifying the ways in which
wrongdoing alters the normative relationships among agents. The rela-
tional view merely imposes a scheme of rights and responsibilities. One
reason it does, one might argue, follows from our understanding of what it
is to have a right. Corrective justice, in this view, is simply part of the
meaning of rights.
Suppose we analyze rights in the following general way. For instance,
to say that you have a right that I not harm you, is to say that I have a duty
20. See supra note 3.
21. See supra note 3.
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not to harm you. These are correlative rights and duties that are primary or
fundamental to the content of the right in question. However, for you to
have such a right means that you have a variety of secondary rights as well;
these are, or can include, metarights-rights about your primary rights.
One such right is that I compensate you in the event that I invade or violate
the first-order right of not harming you. Similarly, we might say that I have
a series of second-order duties correlative of your second-order rights, and
among these, presumably, is the right that I compensate you if I fail to
discharge my first-order duty not to wrong you. Thus, when I harm you in
a way that violates your first-order right, you have a second-order right
against me to repair the resulting damage and I have a corresponding
second-order duty to provide it.
This argument, which purports to provide a conception of corrective
justice, in fact does not mention corrective justice at all. Instead, the
argument draws its conclusions from a particular account of what it is to
have a right. The connection between secondary and primary claims or
rights clearly relies on normative, not analytic, considerations. Even if we
accept the view-which I do not-that correlative of every right is some
specifiable set of duties, and that rights are to be analyzed in terms of the
connection between or among the rights and duties, it hardly follows that
the existence of certain primary rights entails, in any sense, the particular
list of secondary rights or claims that includes the claim to repair. The right
not to be harmed can be protected in any number of ways, each of which
may give rise to very different secondary claims, and some of which may
give rise to no secondary claims at all. Surely, how we should secure or
protect the important interests marked by rights is not a matter of logic, but
a matter of substantive moral argument.
If the duty to compensate and the right to compensation do not follow
as a matter of logic from the nature of what it means to have a right, but
follow instead from a suitable normative principle, from which principle do
they derive? The obvious choice is the principle of corrective justice. In
other words, the duty to compensate and the right to compensation for the
invasion of rights derives from the principle of corrective justice. Or to put
the matter somewhat differently, the second-order right to repair and the
corresponding duty to compensate are ways in which the principle of
corrective justice requires that first-order rights be protected and duties
enforced. The principle of justice, however, does not derive from a plausible
theory of rights. Instead, it is the moral principle external to rights that
gives rights a certain content; it is an element of an underlying foundational
theory of rights, not part of the meaning or syntax of rights. In other words,
we cannot defend a particular conception of corrective justice by showing
that it follows from our understanding of what it is to have a right when it
is that conception of corrective justice itself that grounds that understand-
ing of what it is to have a right. One thing we might say about the relational
conception of corrective justice is that it grounds a particular conception of
what it is to have rights of a certain kind.
IV. A MIXED CONCEPTION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The annulment conception of corrective justice runs into trouble
because it seeks only to articulate grounds of repair. As such, it does no more
HeinOnline  -- 77 Iowa L. Rev. 437 1991-1992
77 IOWA LAW REVIEW
than identify a category of losses about which something ought to be done.
In the limit, the focus on the wrongfulness of the loss as such obliterates the
distinction between corrective and distributive justice. This is one objection
the relationalists press against me. The other objection is that by focusing
on the loss as my previous work does, my account provides no explanation
of how corrective justice gives rise to reasons for action in some agents but
not in others. To illustrate, consider the radio example. If Josephine takes
Ronald's radio, then corrective justice gives Josephine a reason for acting
that no one else has. She has a duty to return it or repair the damage, a duty
no one else has.
These objections have convinced me that the annulment thesis is
inadequate. Here, I provide a new conception of corrective justice that
accommodates both the relational and the annulment conceptions of
corrective justice. I do not want to claim that this conception satisfies every
objection leveled against my previous work; nor do I believe that the
changes in my view will delight, rather than disappoint, those who have
followed me in analyzing corrective justice in terms of annulment or
rectification only. I claim only to provide a plausible conception of
corrective justice that is closer to the truth of the matter than anything I
have previously defended.
The central insight of the relational view I want to incorporate is that
there is a difference between reasons for acting we have as a result of our
actions, and reasons we have by virtue of our being members of a particular
community. As a citizen of the United States, I have reasons for seeing to
it that others are adequately housed and clothed. On. the other hand, if I
promise to meet you for lunch, then I have a reason for acting that I did not
have before I promised to eat lunch with you. This reason is one I might not
have had if I had not so promised, and one which no one else may have. My
act of promising creates the reason for acting. In the same way that
promising can create reasons for acting, my harmful or wrongful actions
also can create reasons for acting. If I negligently injure you, I may have
reasons to act that I would not have had prior to injuring you and reasons
to act that others who have not injured you very likely do not have. In the
case of promising, the reasons to act derive from the accepted conventions
governing the practice of promising. In the case of my negligently injuring
you, the reasons for action and their content derive from the principle of
corrective justice. I accept the relational view's emphasis on the way in
which corrective justice creates special reasons for acting in persons as a
consequence of their actions.
Wrongs are invasions of rights. In the relational view, corrective justice
requires that wrongs be annulled by imposing a duty to repair on the
right-invader. Understood in this way, the relational view denies the
normative relevance of wrongful losses as providing a ground as well as the
content of the duty in corrective justice. This feature of the relational view
is unacceptable. Instead, I defend the aspect of the annulment thesis that
emphasizes wrongful losses both as an aspect of corrective justice and as
part of its point. Thus, I articulate and defend what I call the "mixed
conception" of corrective justice.
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Let us begin by stating precisely the relational conception of corrective
justice. Corrective justice imposes a duty, but what duty? It imposes the
duty by virtue of something a person does, but what is that something that
creates the duty? In the conventional interpretation of the relational view,
it is the fact one has done something wrong that triggers corrective justice.
Corrective justice then operates on the action performed to create and to
impose a duty that would not otherwise have existed. It is a duty to correct
or to annul. Correct or annul what? It is a duty to correct or annul that
which one did that triggered corrective justice in the first place, namely the
wrong. Thus, a natural understanding of the principle of corrective justice
is that corrective justice imposes the duty to repair the wrongs one does.
The relational view emphasizes the wrong one does and not the losses
that might result as a consequence. The duties one has in corrective justice
arise as a result of wrong or wrongdoing, not as a result of wrongful loss.
The duty then is to repair the wrong. What then is the connection between
repairing the wrong (or wrongdoing) and repairing the loss? Indeed, the
problem with the relational view is that it cannot take us from "repairing
the wrong" to "repairing the loss." Moreover, if repairing the loss is not part
of corrective justice, then what can the point of corrective justice be? If
repairing the wrong is unconnected with repairing the losses it occasions,
corrective justice may well leave innocent victims without visible means of
claiming compensation in justice. In that case, corrective justice may have
nothing to do with tort liability for loss, a practice whose point of departure
is the victim's loss.
To illustrate the problem facing the relational view consider an
example. Suppose Steven negligently rams his car into David causing
$1,000 in damages. The annulment thesis holds that David has suffered a
wrongful loss that needs to be eliminated; it then asks whether the best way
of doing justice in this case would impose the loss on Steven or somebody
else. What does the relational view say? First, it notes that what Steven has
done constitutes a wrong. Second, it holds that as a result Steven has
incurred a duty to repair his wrong. The problem is figuring out what the
wrong is; only then can we figure out what needs to be done in order to
repair it.
To focus the discussion further, suppose Michelle drives negligently in
the same way Steven did, but Michelle's negligence causes no damage. In
one view, Steven's wrong was his negligent driving and putting people,
including David, at risk. The negligence is the wrongdoing that needs to be
repaired. Michelle is a wrongdoer in precisely the same way and, we might
suppose for the argument, to the same extent. Each has a duty to repair the
wrong each has done.2 2 We can imagine some plausible ways in which both
can repair the wrong they have done. Steven and Michelle must apologize
to those they put at risk. Or, they must make a public statement conveying
the judgment that they were wrong to treat others as means to their ends.
22. I am not altogether clear about how the wrong is supposed to be repaired, and am
even less clear about how it is to be annulled-especially if the duty to annul is supposed to be
understood in Hegelian terms.
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Or perhaps the only way of annulling the wrong is to imprison them or
otherwise to subject them to expressions of public indignation and disap-
probation.
But what are we to say about David's $1,000 loss? One thing we might
say is that repairing the wrong does not involve repairing the loss. In that
case, David is out of luck. Or we might say that his "wrongful loss" is the
concern of distributive, not corrective justice. In that case, we might rectify
or eliminate his loss through funds raised from the state treasury. Alterna-
tively, we might say that Steven's wrong includes the loss he imposed upon
David. Thus, Steven's wrong is different from Michelle's. Repairing his
wrong would involve both apology and compensation, whereas repairing
hers would require apology only,
The claim that Steven's wrongdoing is different than Michelle's only
because David suffers a loss as a consequence of his mischief begs the
question. What principle makes David's loss part of Steven's wrongdoing
rather than an untoward consequence of it? What did Steven do that
Michelle did not? Each drove negligently, that is, wrongfully. What differs
is the consequences of the wrong, not the wrong itself.
Instead of arguing that Steven's wrong differs from Michelle's simply
because the consequences of their mischief differ, we might argue that even
though the wrongs are the same, the content of the duty to repair the
wrong differs because the consequences of their mischief differ. Both have
done the same wrong; they have driven negligently. Both, therefore, have
the same duty under corrective justice; each has the duty to repair the
wrong. To annul a wrong is to eliminate its effects in the world-as much
as is feasible. That is to say that annulling a wrong returns the world to
where it would have been had the wrong never been committed. In this
sense, to repair fully the wrong is to repair not only the wrong, but its
consequences as well. That would mean giving up whatever gains one has
secured as a result of the wrong as well as compensating for whatever
damage one has caused others to suffer. Though Michelle and Steven have
committed the same wrong, this account of what it means to annul or repair
a wrong explains why Steven and Michelle have different duties in
corrective justice as the result of committing the same wrongful act.
Steven's duty to compensate David is a matter of corrective justice because
it is part of what Stephen must do to repair his wrong. It is part of what he
must do to make the world as if his wrong had never occurred within it.
Michelle's negligence harms no one; repairing her wrong does not require
her to compensate anyone. Thus, the same wrong can yield different
concrete duties under the same abstract duty to repair that wrong.
More importantly, this account explains why Steven must compensate
David in corrective justice without making the fact that David has suffered
a wrongful loss part of the reason-let alone all of the reason as in the
annulment view-for having to do so. The wrongfulness of the loss has
nothing to do with the nature of Steven's duty. Repairing the wrong means
making it as if the wrong had never occurred; that means compensating the
victims. This, I take it, is how the pure relational view ultimately would deal
with the appropriateness of the damage remedy.
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The problem with this account of the relationship between the wrong
and the resulting losses is that it is based on an unacceptable understanding
of what is required in order to "repair" or annul a wrong. For example,
suppose I am scheduled to take a plane from New Haven to Washington
and I take a taxi to the airport. The taxi driver is drunk and drives recklessly
as a result. Five blocks from the airport, the taxi hits another car. My leg is
broken; I am taken to the hospital and I miss my flight. The plane I would
have taken crashes. There are no survivors. Had I caught the plane, I would
have died. Only the taxi driver's recklessness kept me alive.
There is no doubt that the taxi driver acted wrongfully and, as a result,
incurs a debt under corrective justice to repair the wrong committed. But if
we understand repairing the wrong in the way we do in Steven's case, then
the taxi driver has a duty to make the world as if his wrong never happened.
In that world, I would have died in a plane crash; my being alive is a
consequence of his wrong-one for which I am grateful. But can the taxi
driver really have a duty to bring about my death? I do not see how he
could. The duty to repair is not the duty to annul all the consequences of
one's wrongs. It is, I suggest as a first approximation, the duty to repair the
wrong-in whatever sense we can ultimately make of that phrase-and all
the wrongful consequences of it. The gist of my suggestion is that the
wrongfulness of the loss is an independent aspect of corrective justice,
independent of the wrong or wrongdoing itself. Thus, repairing the wrong
and repairing the wrongful losses occasioned by it can be distinct duties
under the principle of corrective justice. If I was wrong in my earlier work
to focus entirely on the wrongfulness of the loss as the point of corrective
justice, then I would commit a greater error by accepting the pure
relational view that treats the loss as only coincidentally connected to the
duty to repair.
These considerations suggest the following characterization of what I
call "the mixed conception of corrective justice." Corrective justice imposes
on wrongdoers the duty to repair their wrongs and the wrongful losses their
wrongdoing occasions. The duty to repair the wrong follows from the
relational view; the importance of wrongful losses to the demands of
corrective justice is a remnant of the annulment view, thus, the "mixed"
view. This conception of corrective justice needs further amendment,
however. Repairing the wrong itself, the cornerstone of the relational view,
is not part of corrective justice at all. The view I defend is that the duty of
wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair only the wrongful losses for
which they are responsible.
V. A WRONG IS NOT ALWAYS WRONG
There are two problems with the notion that corrective justice requires
annulling wrongs. First, the wrongs that typically concern corrective justice
are not wrongs in the sense that usually calls for annulment. Second, to the
extent individuals commit such wrongs, principles of justice designed to
deal with them already exist. In the typical case, an injurer is at fault for
failing to exercise the care that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
would have exercised. Judgments of this sort are not ordinarily defeasible
by what we would think of as an excuse. In the typical case, the fault or
wrong is in the doing, not in the doer. The agent need not have done
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something which calls for blame, something that displays a lack of proper
motivation or a defect in character. The wrongdoing is objective. Similarly,
wrongs that are invasions of rights need not be culpable in the ordinary
sense. In the infringement cases, these wrongs result from conduct that is
on balance justified and not culpable at all. Excusable conduct can be at
fault; justifiable conduct can be rights-invasive and constitute a wrong.
The wrongs that fall within the ambit of corrective justice often do not
mark a moral defect in the agent or in the agent's action. It is hard to see
why annulling them would be a requirement of justice. On the other hand,
some cases of genuine wrongdoing mark a fault in the agent and in the
action. The reckless imposition of unjustifiable levels of risk and the
intentional harming or injuring of another are genuine wrongs. A case
could be made that justice requires annulling them. But there already is a
principle of justice which holds that such wrongs should be annulled: the
principle of retributive justice.
Annulling moral wrongs is a matter of retributive justice, not correc-
tive justice. There exists a legal institution that, in some accounts, is
designed to do retributive justice through punishment. The bulk of cases in
which claims in corrective justice are valid do not involve wrongs in this
sense. If we abandon the view that corrective justice requires annulling
certain wrongs, we are left with the claim that corrective justice imposes a
duty on wrongdoers to annul the wrongful losses their conduct occasions.
Does this mean that we have returned to the annulment thesis, that we
have given up the relational view altogether? No. Corrective justice imposes on
wrongdoers the duty to repair the wrongful losses their conduct occasions. Thus, it
provides wrongdoers with reasons for acting that are peculiar to injurers in
an agent-relative sense; to annul losses for which they are responsible. The
insight of the relational view is that wrongdoing changes the nature of the
relationship between the parties; it creates duties where none previously
existed. It gives agents reasons for acting that they did not previously have.
The problem with the relational view is that it misinterprets the content of
the duty. The annulment thesis correctly interprets the content of the duty.
Thus, we have the mixed conception of corrective justice.
In the relational view, the fact that wrongdoers do something wrong
gives them a duty to repair that wrong. In the mixed view, wrongdoers have
no duty to repair the wrong. Instead, they have a duty to repair the
wrongful losses that are their responsibility. What grounds that duty? It is
not the fact the injurer has done something morally blameworthy or
otherwise culpable-something, in other words, that in fact might ground
a duty to right the wrong. The wrong or wrongdoing the injurer has caused
is relevant because it renders the losses caused wrongful. Without wrong or
wrongdoing, there may be losses, but they are not wrongful. The duty to
correct the losses derives not from the agent's having done wrong as such,
but from the losses being in an appropriate sense the agent's responsibility.
They are the consequences of agency: the agent's causal powers. They are
[19921
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his fault.23
The argument has two parts. First, the losses are the concern of
corrective justice only if they are wrongful. They are wrongful if they result
from wrongs or wrongdoings. The wrong does not ground the duty to
repair. Rather, it grounds the claim that the losses are wrongful and thus
within the ambit of corrective justice. Secondly, the duty to repair those
wrongful losses is grounded not in the fact that they are the result of
wrongdoing, but in the fact that the losses are the injurer's responsibility,
the result of the injurer's agency.24 The duty to repair a loss under
corrective justice is grounded in the injurer's connection to that loss. They
are, in a suitable sense, the injurer's responsibility; they are the injurer's,
and therefore, are the injurer's to repair.
VI. GROUNDS AND MODES OF RECOVERY REVISITED
I previously have argued that under the annulment thesis there is a
difference between the grounds and modes of rectification. 2 5 The question
is whether the distinction is applicable to corrective justice as I now
understand it. In the mixed conception, corrective justice provides both a
grounds for liability and recovery and a reason for claiming that compen-
sation is someone's moral duty. Thus, one might be tempted to hold that
the principle of corrective justice provides both the grounds and the mode
of recovery. That wrongful losses ought to be annulled means that victims
have a right to repair; and because wrongdoers have a duty to repair in
corrective justice, the proper mode of rectification is one that imposes
liability for those costs upon them. In that case, any mode of rectification
other than imposing the victim's costs on the injurer would violate
corrective justice. Is this constraint on liability entailed by the mixed
conception of corrective justice?
Even if the injurer has the duty to repair in justice, it does not follow
that justice requires that the duty be discharged by the injurer. We need to
distinguish between the grounds of the duty and the institutional mecha-
nisms that are permissible ways of implementing the duty. For example, the
duty to repair is a debt of repayment. People who take out loans incur debts
of repayment. We might even say that these are debts injustice. But it does
not follow that an injustice is done whenever someone other than the
indebted individual repays the debt. So if Donald Trump decides to repay
all my debts (for which I would be suitably grateful), and does so (for which
I would be even more grateful), all claims against me would thereby be
23. An agent, S, is responsible for a wrongful loss, W, only if W is S's fault. W is S's fault
only if: (1) S is at fault; (2) W results from an aspect of S's conduct that is at fault; (3) the loss
falls within the scope of reasonable foreseeable risk in virtue of which that aspect of S's conduct
is at fault. This analysis defeats the objections mistakenly raised against my account by Weinrib
and Wright.
24. If we inquire further, and want to know why responsibility or causal power are
necessary to impose a duty to repair, the answer is even more tentative. It is through the
exercise of the powers of autonomous agency that individuals make their mark in the world.
It is through their actions that we come to understand individuals, and more importantly, it is
through our actions that we come to our own self-understandings.
25. See supra note 11.
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extinguished. If the loans are repaid by someone other than me, no
injustice has been done. This is true even if it is me, not Donald Trump,
who has the duty injustice to repay the debts. This is true, moreover, even
if Trump does this all on his own, without any encouragement from me, or
in the absence of a contractual or other understanding between us.
This example illustrates that someone other than the indebted party
can discharge the duty without constituting an injustice. Therefore, it does
not follow from the fact that one is required to make repair as a matter of
corrective justice that any institutional arrangement, or mode of rectifica-
tion, which discharges that duty in some other way (for example, through
the general tax coffers) would be unjust. The question to consider is: what
modes of rectification are compatible with the mixed conception of
corrective justice?
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I have distinguished among three conceptions of corrective justice: the
annulment view, the relational view, and the mixed conception. The
annulment view holds that wrongful gains and losses ought to be annulled.
It does not specify by whom. It does, however, treat the existence of certain
gains and losses as determining its domain and purpose. In contrast, the
relational view holds that individuals who do wrong (or wrongdoers) have
a duty to repair the wrong. It selects the person who has the duty; indeed,
its entire point is to create the agent-relative duty. In the relational view,
however, wrongs and not losses (or gains) are its domain and provide the
content of the duty. The mixed view holds that individuals have a duty to
repair the wrongful losses for which they are responsible. Like the
annulment view, the mixed view treats the existence of wrongful losses as
morally relevant to its purpose. Its point is to rectify them. To this end,
however, it imposes the duty to repair on the person responsible for
creating a wrongful loss. The relational view is correct to fault the
annulment view for failing to connect the demands of corrective justice to
individual reasons for acting. The annulment view iscorrect to emphasize
the moral significance of wrongful losses. The relational view misses this
point entirely. The mixed view captures the important insights of both my
previous view and its critics.
Nothing I have said here reaches three questions that remain: (1)
What conception of wrong and wrongdoing is implicated in the mixed
conception of corrective justice? (2) Does corrective justice permit the
duties it imposes to be discharged by individuals other than those it
encumbers? (If so, under what conditions?); and, (3) To what extent does
modern tort law reflect or express the mixed conception of corrective
justice? My purpose in this Essay has been the modest, but important, one
of defending a conception of corrective justice. The next order of business
will be to explore its limits and the extent to which it is reflected in our legal
practices.2 6
26. These issues are more fully explored in Coleman, supra note *.
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